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TACKING LEFT: A RADICAL CRITIQUE OF 
GRUTTER 
Daria Roithmayr* 
[Rjace conscious policies must be limited in time ... We 
expect that twenty-five years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the in-
terest approved today. 
Justice O'Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger' 
INTRODUCTION 
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court announced its 
expectation that twenty-five years from now, U.S. educational 
institutions will no longer need to use racial conscious affirma-
tive action in admissions to admit a racially diverse class. Of 
course, time will tell whether Justice O'Connor's expectation 
will be given the force of law or regarded as dicta.2 But dicta or 
not, law schools are highly unlikely in the next twenty-five years 
to be able to admit diverse classes without using race-conscious 
affirmative action. Racial inequality at all levels-education, 
housing, income and wealth- has become a remarkably stable 
feature of racial hierarchy in the U.S.3 
Certainly with regard to conventional measures of merit for 
law school admission (i.e., grades and standardized test scores), 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. Thanks to Nancy Cantor, 
Evan Caminker, Don Herzog, Laura Beny and Kimberle Crenshaw for provocative de-
bate and disagreement, counterassertions and general conversation about Grutter and 
affirmative action. Thanks to Dave McGowan, Tom Ulen and Ian Ayres, for helpful 
comments and assistance in understanding obscure economic math. Thanks also to Ryan 
Calo for research assistance on various parts of this Essay. All errors and wrongheaded 
arguments arc, of course, my own. 
l. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-43 (2003). 
2. See Vikram Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting? Justice 
O'Connor's Closing Comments in Gruttcr, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541 (2003) (dis-
cussing the question of whether the sunset clause was dicta or to be given force of law). 
3. MICHAEL BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-
BLIJSD SOCIETY 12-15 (2003) (documenting black-white disparities in income, housing, 
and health care). 
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racial disparities are as pervasive as they were when the Court 
decided Bakke twenty-five years ago. For the 2002-03 academic 
year, the median LSA T score for black applicants was 142.2, 
compared to a median white score of 153.9.<t Thus, at present, 
black scores are about 19 percent lower than white scores. The 
differences at the top end of the scale are far more dramatic: 
blacks make up less than 1 percent of those scoring 165 or above 
on the LSA T. By most accounts, the gap has persisted for the 
last twenty-five years, despite improvements in the economy and 
a growing black middle-class.6 Moreover, the racial gap in LSAT 
scores may now be increasing. Over the past five years, the racial 
scoring gap has increased by 0.9 points, or 1.5 percent.7 
For the last decade, the issue of affirmative action in higher 
education has bedeviled those of us on the left. Even the most 
radical of critical race theorists acknowledges that, in connection 
with Grutter, we needed to defend small-scale diversity-oriented 
programs in order to hold the line on affirmative action roll-
backs. As a symbolic matter, affirmative action represented the 
most visible form of commitment to dismantling racial hierarchy. 
And, in the wake of Hopwood and Proposition 209, radical 
scholars had to acknowledge the very real possibility that an in-
creasingly conservative Supreme Court would cut back even fur-
ther on the vitality of race-conscious preferences. Holding the 
line in Grutter was of the essence in the battle with conservatives 
over affirmative action. 
At the same time, as a practical matter, we recognized the 
limits of diversity-based affirmative action. The small-scale af-
firmative action programs adopted by law schools produced few 
material gains for most people in communities of color. We 
knew that in most elite schools, diversity programs admit rela-
4. Latest News: A Widening Racial Gap in Law School Applications and Scores on 
the Law School Admission Test, 1. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. available at http://www. 
jbhe.comllatest/052004_law-school_admissions.html (May 20, 2004). 
5. Latest News: Very Few Blacks Can Be Found at Top of LSAT Scoring Pyramid, 
J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. available at www.jbhe.com/latest/052704_blacks_and_ 
LSAT.html (May 27, 2004). 
6. See LINDA WIGHTMAN, BEYOND FY A: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UTILITY OF 
LSAT SCORES AND UNDERGRADUATE GPA FOR PREDICTING ACADEMIC SUCCESS IN 
LAW SCHOOL 8-14 (2000). See also The Persisting Racial Scoring Gap in Graduate and 
Professional School Admissions Tests, 38 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (Winter 2002/2003) 
(documenting a persistent 18% gap). See also Special Report: Confronting the Widening 
Racial Scoring Gap on the SAT, 41 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (Autumn, 2003); THE 
BLACK WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998). 
7. In 1997-98, the median black LSAT score was 142.7. The median white score 
was 153.5. See Latest News, supra note 4. 
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tively small numbers of students.8 We acknowledged that diver-
sity-oriented programs concealed the racial bias of ostensibly 
race-neutral standards.9 And from experience within our own in-
stitutions, we were painfully aware that the diversity rationale 
permitted institutions to claim that they were "for affirmative ac-
tion," without having to make a commitment to eliminating the 
legacy of past discrimination. 10 
Ultimately, in the period leading up to the Court's decision 
in Grutter, many of us committed ourselves and our scholarship 
(despite our ambivalence) to the very pragmatic task of defend-
ing diversity-based affirmative action. But now that the Court 
has approved some form of race-conscious affirmative action, 
the time may have come for the left to tack left again: to strongly 
reassert the far more expansive view of racial equality, and to 
argue for a much larger-scale, much more robust form of af-
firmative action to accompany that view. 
In that spirit, this article advances three central critiques of 
the Court's decision in Grutter-one pragmatic, one utopian and 
the last deeply cynical. First, I will argue that Justice O'Connor's 
timetable for eliminating race-conscious affirmative action is un-
realistic. Racial inequality in conventional measures of merit will 
persist into the foreseeable future, because this inequality is part 
of a much larger dynamic process that produces persistent racial 
inequality in many areas. 
I describe this process using what I have come to call the 
"lock-in" model of racial inequality. 11 The lock-in model com-
pares persistent racial disparity to persistent monopoly power 
that continues long after the original anti-competitive conduct 
has ceased. Just as a monopoly can become institutionally self-
reinforcing over time, so too can racial monopoly reproduce it-
self over time via institutional processes. 
This Essay proposes that disparities in performance on ad-
missions criteria persist because whites have created a self-
reinforcing monopoly on those educational resources that are 
needed to achieve high GPAs and standardized test scores. If so, 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See id. 
10. See id. 
II. For a full description of the lock-in model of racial inequality, sec Daria Raith· 
mayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 
(2000). See also Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimina-
tiOn, 9 MICH. J. RACE AND L. 31 (2003); Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation (un-
published draft, on file with author). 
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racial disparities likely will continue, as will the need for some 
form of affirmative action, until that monopoly is dismantled, 
Second, I will argue that diversity-based affirmative action 
does little to address what may well be locked-in disparities. Ex-
perts insist that, to dismantle the self-reinforcing cycle, massive 
affirmative action is needed. Unfortunately, Grutter is the last in 
a long line of cases that forecloses the very sort of large-scale af-
firmative action programs in education that could assist in creat-
ing change. 
Third, I will argue that, although Grutter provides little ma-
terial benefit for communities of color, the decision materially 
and symbolically privileges white interests. The opinion priori-
tizes the interests of white students in breaking down their 
stereotypes about minorities and in adding diverse perspectives 
to classroom conversations. In addition, the Court's opinion al-
lows institutions to conceal the bias of conventional admissions 
standards. Last but not least, the Court's opinion constitutionally 
protects elite meritocracy, in a way that further privileges white 
interests. 
Part I provides a brief primer on the self-reinforcing lock-in 
model of inequality, which I have developed in previous work. 
Part II applies the lock-in model to the problem of persistent ra-
cial disparities in education. This section focuses on the broad 
self-reinforcing dynamic process that links a neighborhood's as-
sets to those of families within the neighborhood. Drawing from 
the insights developed from the lock-in model, Part III fully 
fleshes out the three critiques of Grutter described above. 
I. A PRIMER ON THE LOCK-IN MODEL OF 
INEQUALITY 
In previous work, I have developed the lock-in model of ra-
cial inequality to explain the dynamics of racial inequality. 12 
Drawing from recent work in economics and antitrust, the lock-
in model is designed to explain how monopolies can become 
self-reinforcing over time to become a permanent part of the 
economic landscape. More specifically, the model demonstrates 
12. See Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry, supra note 11 (developing the lock-in model 
and arguing that the use of conventional law school admissions standards constitutes a 
locked-in network standard that favors whites). See also Roithmayr, Locked In Inequal-
ity, supra note 11 (arguing that the South African government chose to retain educational 
user fees despite their disproportionate racial impact because the government would m-
cur high switching costs to equalize expenditures across racial lines). 
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how monopolies can persist even in the absence of intentional 
anti-competitive conduct. 
Locked-in monopolies can be produced in a variety of set-
tings. In certain markets that are characterized by "increasing re-
turns," a firm can acquire an early competitive advantage, which 
then becomes self-reinforcing over time. For example, some 
commentators argue that Microsoft engaged in exclusive con-
tracts with suppliers and in other conduct designed to prevent 
the distribution of competitor technology. 13 This anti-
competitive conduct created (and reinforced) a self-reinforcing 
advantage that linked software developers and consumers. Win-
dows' popularity induced more software authors to write soft-
ware, which in turn triggered an increase in consumers. The in-
crease in consumers thereby induced even more software 
authors to write for Windows, and so on. 14 Thus, Microsoft's ad-
vantage became locked-in because of the positive feedback loop 
that permitted the advantage to reproduce itself. 
Beyond increasing returns markets, a market might become 
locked-in when consumers face high costs to switch ("switching 
costs") from the market incumbent to a more innovative com-
petitor.15 If consumers cannot make the switch easily, then their 
unwillingness to move may lock in the incumbent's early advan-
tage. For example, when consumers choose to switch from a 
VCR to a DVD player, they must pay not only the cost of the 
new product but also the cost to recreate their library in DVD 
format and the cost of lost access to their video network- the 
group of friends, family, video stores and other sources of videos 
who may not yet have made the switch. 16 These additional 
switching costs may prolong the initial competitive advantage 
that the VCR technology has over the more innovative DVD 
technology. 17 
13. See Declaration of Prof. Franklin M. Fisher in Support of Plaintiff, USA v. Mi-
crosoft (147 F.3d 935) available ar http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f17(XJI1766.htm. 
14. See, e.g., BRIAN W. ARTHVR, !NCREAS1NG RETURNS A"'D PATH DEPENDENCE 
IN THE ECONOMY 102 (1994) (explaining the self-reinforcing process of increasing re-
turns generally); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 13 (using the Microsoft example). 
15. For a discussion of switching costs in the market context, sec A. Douglas 
Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 150 
(1999). For a discussion of the role of switching costs in the lock-in model of inequality 
see Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality, supra note 11, at 61-65. ' 
16. See Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality, supra note 11 at 39. 
17. See id. 
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Finally, "path-dependent" markets will also produce locked-
in monopolies.I 8 In path dependent markets, small historical 
events that happen early in the formation of the industry may ex-
plain a great deal about subsequent market outcomes.I9 In the 
most oft-cited example, Paul David asserts that a typing contest 
held in 1874 ultimately produced the monopoly position of a par-
ticular keyboard arrangement in the typewriter market.20 Because 
the winning typist had used a QWERTY keyboard, the victory 
produced a small competitive lead over other keyboards.2I 
This "early-mover" advantage then became institutionally 
self-reinforcing because of the "network" relationship between 
typists, employers and keyboards. Typists wanted to train on the 
most popular keyboard, and, in turn, employers wanted to adopt 
the keyboard on which most typists were trained.22 Each in-
crease in typists produced an increase in employers who adopted 
the keJboard, thereby triggering another increase in typists, and 
so on. Ultimately, QWERTY came to dominate the field based 
on the self-reinforcing effects of the early victory.24 
As this example demonstrates, institutionally self-
reinforcing processes may become locked in if they create barri-
ers to entry that prevent competitors from catching up. In the 
QWERTY example, the early winner's competitive advantage 
may have become locked in place because an employer who 
wanted to switch to an alternative faced significant switching 
costs-namely, the loss of a ready-trained labor pool.25 Switching 
costs can create barriers to entry for a competitor, and even for 
18. For a full discussion of path dependence, see Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen H. 
Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In and History, 111. L. ECON & ORO. 205 (1995). See 
ARTHUR, supra note 14, at 102. See also Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry, supra note 11, at 
742-49. 
19. See Stanley M. Bcsen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies 
and Tactics in Standardization, 81. ECON. PERSP. 117,118 (1994); Nicholas Economides, 
The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS. ORO 673,694 (1996). 
20. See PAUL A. DAVID, UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF QWERTY: THE 
NECESSITY OF HISTORY IN ECONOMIC HISTORY AND MODERN ECONOMICS 30-49 (Wil-
liam N. Parker ed., 1986). See also Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 
AMER. ECON. REV. 332 (1985); Paul David, Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of His-
tory'? Notes on Path-Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and 
Institutions (October 1992) (unpublished paper). 
21. The QWERTY keyboard begins with those letters on the upper row. See David, 
Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, supra note 20, at 334. 
22. See id. at 335. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
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those competitors who offer consumers a more "efficient" prod-
uct, like a more innovative keyboard arrangement.26 
Just as a firm's early monopoly advantage can become 
locked into the market over time, so too can a racial cartel's 
early monopoly advantage become institutionally impossible to 
dismantle, even in the absence of continuing intentional dis-
crimination. In the same way that a monopoly advantage can be-
come self-reinforcing because of institutional structures, institu-
tional racism can also reproduce inequality indefinitely. 
The lock-in model puts forward three central claims about 
the nature of racial inequality. First, early racial history matters. 
Persistent racial inequality can be traced to earlier events that 
have charted a particular course of history for different racial 
groups?7 As is true with the QWERTY example, the effect of 
early monopoly efforts by white racial cartels may help to ex-
plain far more about contemporary outcomes than conventional 
theory would predict.28 
Second, whites' early anti-competitive advantage may now 
have become self-reinforcing?9 As with economic markets, in 
race relations, early anti-competitive conduct can produce in-
creasing returns for the early mover. In the context of residential 
segregation, for example, early monopoly advantage can repro-
duce itself through a variety of mechanisms, including schooling 
and networks of access to employment.30 
Third, in the absence of some intervening event, racial dis-
parities may persist indefinitely.31 Any policy looking to remedy 
locked-in racial inequality would have to consider the structural 
26. See id. at 332. Developed in the 1920s by August Dvorak, the Dvorak keyboard 
arrangement is, according to some, a vastly superior keyboard arrangement when compared 
to QWERTY. See R.C. CASSINGHAM, THE DVORAK KEYBOARD 21-16,41-43 (1986). For 
an argument that the two keyboards are at best equally efficient, see Stan J. Liebowitz & 
Steven E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. 1. 
L. & TECH. 283, 312-14 (1996); STAN 1. LIEBOWITZ & STEVEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, 
LOSERS AND MICROSOFT (1999). 
27. Borrowed from evolutionary theory, the concept of path dependence makes tht: 
claim that early events can chart the evolutionary path of subsequent conditions for a 
long time to come. See, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 18; Mark J. Roc, Chaos 
and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 634-52 (1996). See also 
Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry, supra note 11, at 752; Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality, 
supra note 11, at 66. 
28. See id. In this project, I discussed the self-reinforcing impact of early decisions 
to exclude people of color from legal education, and to develop admissions standards 
that disproportionately excluded candidates of color. See id. 
29. See id. at 65. 
30. See Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11. 
31. See Roithmayr, Locked In Inequality, supra note 11, at 61-64. 
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and political switching costs of restructuring or modifying rou-
tine institutional practices.32 If switching costs increase as time 
passes, these costs may help to further cement in racial inequal-
ity as part of the U.S. sociallandscape.33 
II. LOCKED-IN EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 
A. EARLY ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT IN EDUCATION 
This section argues that whites engaged in anti-competitive 
activities and secured an early mover advantage in education re-
sources, housing and other neighborhood-based assets. Other 
scholars have documented the history of Jim Crow segregation 
in public education.34 This discussion concentrates more nar-
rowly on cartel-like activities by a particular set of institutional 
organizations in monopolizing education. 
Economists use the concept of cartels to explain how groups 
of people who might otherwise act individually to pursue their 
own self-interest might nevertheless collaborate to exclude oth-
ers from competition.35 Robert Cooter and others have de-
scribed how racial cartels worked to create and to maintain ra-
cial and economic exclusion, by: (i) agreeing on a collective 
purpose to drive out competitors, (ii) constructing a complex set 
32. In the law school admissions context, any law school contemplating a move to 
reduce its reliance on the LSAT (e.g., to shift to a process that focuses on the student's 
performance within a band of achievement) must face significant potential switching 
costs in doing so. In particular, a school risks a potentially significant drop in its rankings 
(by way of the U.S. News and World Report system, which prioritizes LSAT scores). In 
addition, a school risks a corresponding loss of reputation, drop in enrollments, reduced 
employability of graduates and reduced funding from alumni donors. Moreover, a law 
school choosing to abandon the test altogether would have to incur the cost of develop-
ing and administering its own admissions test-the LSA T is currently administered for all 
law schools by the centralized Law School Admissions Council. See Roithmayr, Barriers 
to Entry, supra note 11. 
33. Charles Tilly describes the concept of switching costs in his discussion of dura-
ble inequality. 
Existing social arrangements have enduring advantages because their theo-
retical alternatives always entail the costs of movement away from the present 
situation; change therefore occurs under conditions that reduce returns from ex-
isting arrangements, raise their current operating costs, lower the costs of transi-
tion to alternative arrangements or (much more rarely) increase expected re-
turns from alternative sufficiently to overcome the transitions costs. 
CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY 192 (1998). 
34. See, e.g., C. V ANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d cd., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1974). 
35. See, e.g., GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 
167 (1946). For an excellent discussion of cartels in game theory and complex systems 
theory, see Christopher Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004). 
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of informal and formal norms to coordinate collective conduct, 
and (iii) imposing measures to punish members who defect 
and/or violate collective norms.36 As the following discussion il-
lustrates, whites were able to coordinate their anti-competitive 
behavior more efficiently by forming cartel-like organizations.37 
By 1920, whites in the Northern cities had begun to perceive 
black migration into the cities as a significant threat to their way of 
life. In those cities, school segregation followed closely from 
neighborhood segregation. School officials in Northern cities often 
maintained school segregation by redrawing feeder zones for schools 
where the racial demographics were changing, and by Fsrrnitting 
white students to transfer out of mixed school populations. 8 
By comparison, in the South, whites focused more directly 
on school segregation than on separation of residential loca-
tion.39 Some southern cities passed segregation codes requirinJa 
separate schools and separate buildings within the same school. 
Southern school officials also acted informally and without au-
thorization to separate schools, and continued to do so even af-
ter segregation codes were declared unconstitutional.41 
In the Southwest, whites perceived the rapid influx of Mexi-
cans to be as much a social and economic threat as newly freed 
blacks were in the North and South. Mexicans had migrated to 
work on railroads and in agribusiness, and between 1920 and 
1930, the Mexican population in California tripled.42 From the 
beginning, schools kept Mexican children separate, arguing that 
separation was necessary to Americanize these students, and re-
36. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 133, 150 
(1994). See also Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group 
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1046-48 (1995) (ar-
guing that coercive social norms served to suppress defection and free-riders). 
37. For a detailed account of cartel activities to secure neighborhood monopolies, 
see Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11. 
38. See Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue, Gratz v. Bollinger, (E. D. Mich.) (No. 
97-75321); Gruttcr v. Bollinger (E.D. Mich.) (No. 97-75928). 
39. In Southern cities, whites could not easily divide up the city by race-the crea-
tion of a ghetto was limited by spatial, technical and economic constraints. As in slavery, 
blacks lived in close proximity to sources of work and economic support. See 
WOODWARD, supra note 34. 
40. For example, Louisville, Kentucky imposed a statutory requirement that blacks 
and whites live in separate sections of the city. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 
(1917) (holding the Louisville statute unconstitutional). 
41. See Cartwright v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Coffeyville, 73 Kan. 32,34 (boards 
cannot act in the absence of a statute). But see 1909 Kan. Laws 525 (statute overturning 
earher statute that had prohibited segregation). 
42. See CHARLES WOLLENBERG, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: SEGREGATION AND 
EXCLUSION, 1855-1975111 (1976). 
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lying on stereotypes about health and morals. 43 Corporate 
ranches in the Southwest created separate company towns, 
which included schools for the children of laborers.4 Some states 
in the Southwest, including California, passed segregation laws 
to authorize separate classrooms and buildings.45 
In all areas of the country, school boards effectively acted as 
racial cartels, to coordinate school segregation across communi-
ties. School boards opened separate schools for black students at 
the turn of the century, sometimes in separate buildings outside 
of the main school and sometimes within the same building.46 In 
some states, members of the school board were also members of 
white racist organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan, and they 
coordinated school segregation with these other segregation ef-
forts.47 For Mexican-Americans in California, school boards also 
played a central role in keeping white and Mexican children in 
separate classrooms.48 
In addition to school boards, parents' groups also worked in 
cartel-like ways to monopolize access to good schools. Parents' 
groups worked collectively to intimidate any black families seek-
ing to integrate public schools. They also mobilized effectively 
against those few school boards that argued to desegregate 
school systems. For example, when a Detroit school board pro-
posed an open schools plan that permitted blacks children to at-
tend all-white schools, white parents' groups organized to peti-
tion the recall of elected school board members. They also 
organized a school boycott, in which students boycotted classes 
for several days.49 In addition, parent organizations pressured 
school officials to revise feeder district boundaries to keep 
schools segregated, and lobbied for the passage of segregation 
codes to keep schools separate.50 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See, e.g., CAL EDUC. CODE§§ 8003-04. 
46. See Board of Educ. of Ottawa v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 (1881), Knox v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Ind., 45 Kan. 152 (1891) (moving from segregation inside the building-hiring special 
educator-to segregation outside the school), Reynolds v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 66 
Kan. 672 (1903) (separate building outside school). Rowles v. Bd. of Educ. of Wichita, 76 
Kan. 361 (1907) (board passes a resolution to segregate "in keeping with the ideals and 
wishes of a majority of patrons"). 
47. See Thurman-Watts v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Coffeyville, 115 Kan. 328 
(1924) (president of the board admits membership). 
48. See also WOLLENBERG, supra note 42, at 127. 
49. See Expert Report, supra note 38; JEFFREY MIREL, THE RISE AND FALL OF AN 
URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: DETROIT, 1907-81 188-93,258-61 (1999). 
50. See Expert Report, supra note 38. 
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The rhetoric surrounding school segregation drew in large 
part on ideas about the potential competitiveness of blacks as la-
bor. Whites wanted to monopolize education resources for 
themselves in order to keep blacks from posing an economic 
threat to white industry. In a speech to the Southern Education 
Association justifying segregation in education, Professor Paul 
Barringer invoked the idea of spending school resources only for 
those who might move into skilled or professional labor: "The 
Negro race is essentially a race of peasant farmers and labor-
ers ... As a source of cheap labor for a warm climate he is be-
yond competition. "51 
Motivated by the desire to exclude non-whites both eco-
nomically and socially, white cartels thus secured a monopoly on 
access to education resources As the next section discusses, these 
resources are essential to producing the particular social skills, 
high test scores and GPAs that law schools (and employers) 
have come to value. 
B. THE SELF-REINFORCING NATURE OF 
EDUCATION MONOPOLY 
This section argues that the white monopoly advantage in 
education produced by these cartels may have become institu-
tionally self-reinforcing over time. Historical segregation pro-
duced geographic pockets of people with better tax bases. 
Neighborhoods with more educational resources have produced 
neighbors with more wealth. In turn, neighbors with more 
wealth have produced neighborhoods with more educational re-
sources. In this way, white advantages in education reproduce 
themselves over time. 
According to recent research in complex systems theory and 
economics, persistent racial inequality in education can be ex-
plained by the existence of "neighborhood effects" or "network 
effects." Neighborhood effects are the self-reinforcing effects of 
institutional relationships that link a family's well-being to that 
of its neighborhood, and the neighborhood's status, in turn, to 
that of the resident neighbor families. 52 Neighborhood effects 
explain why neighborhood characteristics can become persistent 
over time-the neighborhood affects the status of families, and 
51. /d. at 95 (citing to speech before the Southern Education Association in 1900). 
52. For a general overview of neighborhood effects, sec Xavier de Sousa Briggs, 
Moving Up Versus Moving Out: Neighborhood Effects in Housing Mobility Programs, 8 
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 195 (1997). 
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families affect the status of the neighborhood. 53 Leonard Rubi-
nowitz and James Rosenbaum have used the term "geography of 
opportunity" to describe the idea that social capital is derived 
from living in particular neighborhoods, and that neighborhoods 
in turn benefit from particular kinds of people. 54 
The effect of public school finance on neighborhood fami-
lies constitutes a neighborhood effect that structures group 
wealth and income. The school finance feedback loop consists of 
two parts: (i) the way in which family wealth, and relatedly 
property values, feed forward to affect neighborhood educa-
tional resources (because property taxes are used to fund public 
schools); and (ii) the way in which neighborhood educational re-
sources feed back to affect family wealth and property values. 55 
As an aside, it is important to note here that the lock-in 
model does not assume that educational resources affect a fam-
ily's status by increasing cognitive skills in any intrinsically valu-
able way. Rather, the model merely assumes that education 
functions to socialize children to perform in certain ways that are 
valued by standardized tests and future employers.56 Indeed, the 
53. Much of this work on neighborhood effects and racial inequality focuses on the 
self-reinforcing effects of "culture." See id. In contrast, this project focuses more on re-
source effects- the relatively more hard-edged constraints created by collective re-
sources family and individual outcomes. Although psycho-social behaviors in neighbor-
hoods may have important self-reinforcing effects via collective socialization, contagion 
or relative deprivation, the research indicates that these behaviors ultimately are con-
nected to the availability or lack of resources within a neighborhood. See, e.g., DALTON 
CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LiVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY IN 
AMERICA 23 (1999) ("[c]ultural practices constitute the manifestation of and reaction to 
economic class conditions in which blacks and whites tend to find themselves"). 
54. Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum documented the results from the Gautreaux As-
sisted Housing Program, a program that moved over 7100 black families to the Chicago 
suburbs as part of a consent decree. These scholars found that for those families who 
moved to the suburbs, 54% of children from those families enrolled in college, versus 
21% of a control group who used their Section 8 benefits to move within the city. Of the 
mothers who moved to the suburbs, 75% were working versus 41% of those who moved 
to the city. Recent follow-up research has confirmed that these differences have persisted 
over time. LEONARD RUBINOWITZ AND JAMES ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS 
AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000). To be sure, 
there are difficulties with this data. Researchers could not disentangle the effects of self-
selection-the families who chose to use their Section 8 certificates to move to white sub-
urbs may have already represented a particular cross-section of the population. Relat-
edly, the comparison reference group (families who had not participated in the MTO 
program counseling, and who used their Section 8 certificates to move to black neighbor-
hoods) may not have represented a true control group because they also represent a par-
ticular cross-section of the population. See id. 
55. This process has become racialized because segregation created racially ho-
mogenous neighborhoods with significant differences in income, wealth, property values 
and educational spending per pupil. See infra Part Ila. 
56. Sociologists have long put forward the notion that schools select and then so-
2004] A RADICAL CRITIQUE OF GRUTIER 203 
model acknowledges that social preferences for particular kinds 
of performances drive what is valued in economic, and therefore 
educational, performance. 57 
In the public school finance feedback loop, non-white 
neighborhoods with poor tax bases produce under-funded 
schools. In turn, underfunded schools produce non-white 
neighborhoods with poor tax bases, because poorer schools pro-
duce graduates with less income and wealth. Likewise, white 
neighborhoods with good tax bases produce schools with good 
funding, which in turn produce a good tax base. In addition, be-
cause property with good schools costs more than property 
without, non-white residents are less able to move to a 
neighborhood with good schools. 
A number of scholars have formally modeled this public 
school finance neighborhood effect and its connection to resi-
dential segregation.58 According to this research, the "neighbor-
hood effects" of public school finance appear sufficiently strong 
that, in otherwise economically mixed neighborhoods, small dif-
ferences in public school financing will cause the neighborhoods 
to become segre?ated by income, even in the absence of previ-
ous segregation.5 
Economist Roland Benabou's theoretical work illustrates 
the dynamics of this process.60 Benabou's model begins with two 
neighborhoods that contain an equal mix of rich and poor fami-
lies. If education spending per pupil in one neighborhood be-
comes slightly higher than the other, the land in the neighbor-
hood with better schools becomes more valuable, and rich 
families are more able to purchase the property. In turn, families 
in neighborhoods with higher education spending become even 
wealthier, and accordingly are able to devote even more of their 
income to school finance (which in turn makes the property even 
more expensive). Because the improvement in income becomes 
self reinforcing by way of school funding, even minor differences 
cialize students for future employment. See, e.g., Talcott Parsons, The School Class as a 
Social System, 29 HARV. EDUC. REV. 297 (1959). 
57. See Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Merit and Bias, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1997) (arguing that social norms produce notions of what constitutes 
merit). 
58. Roland Bcnabou, Equity and Efficiency in Human Capita/Investment: The Lo-
cal Connection, 63 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 237, 238 (1996); see also Shelley Lundberg and 
Richard Startz, On the Persistence of Racial Inequality, 16 J. LABOR ECON. 292 (1998). 
59. See id. 
60. See Benabou, supra note 58. See also Roland Benabou, Human Capital, Ine-
quality and Growth: A Local Perspective, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 817 (1994). 
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in education spending can cause neighborhoods to segregate by 
income.61 This is true even when the incomes for both groups are 
growing.62 
Benabou's model demonstrates that the public school fi-
nance loop and its links to the tax base can transmit education 
inequality indefinitely over many generations.63 Because of rela-
tive advantages in the tax base and per pupil expenditures, 
wealthy neighborhoods are more likely to sustain their affluence 
over time, and thus the superiority of their educational re-
sources. Moreover, the gap between rich and poor can grow infi-
nitely large, at least in theory. 64 
Most importantly for this project, Benabou concludes that 
racial disparities in education may now be locked in because of 
the self-reinforcing effects of historical segregation.65 According 
to Benabou, historical segregation accomplished two important 
goals. First, segregation created a white neighborhood surplus by 
increasing the spending per pupil (and/or lowering tax rates), 
and thereby increasing the value of property in the neighbor-
hood (which now reflected the availability of well-funded 
schools).66 More importantly, segregation allowed whites to mo-
nopolize the benefit of the extra spending per pupil, and to avoid 
having to pay the higher land prices they would have to pay if 
blacks had been allowed to bid on the land.67 Non-whites looking 
to move to white neighborhoods must pay the correlative value 
of the additional social capital.68 
Thus, in Benabou's view, these advantages may now be 
locked in because blacks do not possess sufficient wealth to 
move into richer white neighborhoods with better schools.69 
61. In Bcnabou's model, the wealthy arc more willing or more able to pay higher 
housing costs for three reasons. First, wealthy families as a matter of preference may be 
more sensitive to neighborhood quality. Second, capital market imperfections may dis-
able the poor from borrowing to be able to move into the wealthier neighborhoods. Fi-
nally, differences in lifetime wealth can also explain the relatively greater ability of the 
wealthy to pay. See Benabou, supra note 58, at 233-43. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. See also Steven Durlau[, Neighborhood Effects, in 4 HANDBOOK OF 
REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2 (J.V. Henderson and J.F. Thisse eds., 2003). 
64. See id. at 519. In addition, stratification of this type exerts maximum effect on 
inequality-that is, it maximizes the income of the wealthiest family, at the same time it 
minimizes the income of the lowest-income family. See id. at 516. 
65. See Benabou, Local Connection, supra note 58, at 247. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. It is important to note here the difference between wealth and income. Al-
though a number of studies report that housing segregation cannot be explained by rac1al 
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Blacks are no longer barred by law, but are now barred by the 
relatively more difficult time they have buying into an increas-
ingly expensive white neighborhood.70 Benabou concludes that 
remedies are unlikely to be effective if neighborhood differences 
already have become locked in. Equalizing school budgets is not 
likely to work because the cumulative disadvantage is now too 
great to overcome. Nor at this late stage would it be effective to 
increase incentives to lure rich families to poor communities.71 
The public school finance loop also reproduces inequalities 
in access to higher education. People who attend underfunded 
public schools are less likely to earn the kind of income or ac-
quire the kind of wealth necessary to pay for higher education.72 
Because of the substantial wealth gap between races, many if not 
most black and Latino/a parents cannot offer their children any 
significant assistance in attending college. 73 
Almost all scholars on the subject agree that a college degree, 
or any time spent in higher education, enables a person to get jobs 
that pay more, which in turn leads to greater income and greater 
wealth accumulation.74 The net worth of graduates with college 
degrees is double that of those without degrees.75 In turn, families 
with greater wealth are far more likely to be able to send children 
to college or university, owing to skyrocketing costs for tuition 
these days.76 Racial disparities in wealth, not surprisingly, repro-
duce themselves via the opportunity to attend college. 77 
To be sure, the general question of whether increased funding 
per student corresponds to improved education and/or improved 
wealth is controversial. One of the earliest studies on the matter, 
the 1966 Coleman Report, found little association between funding 
differences in income, those studies do not take into account differences in accumulated 
wealth, which is more important in housing purchases. See MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS 
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL 
EQUALITY (1995). 
70. See id. See also Durlauf, supra note 63, at 520 (concluding that the possible 
permanence of inequality seems appropriate for analyzing the U.S. economy, where the 
economic status of blacks has been so strongly affected by historical factors). 
71. See Benabou, supra note 58. 
72. See Thomas J. Kane, College Attendance By Blacks Since 1970: The Role of Col-
lege Cost, Family Background and Returns to Education, 102 J. POUT. ECON. 878 (1994). 
73. In Michigan, college attendance for four or more years differs between blacks 
and whites by a ratio of 56 to 1, and college degrees by a ratio of 85 to 1, both ratios hav-
ing steadily increased over the last thirty years. Expert Report, supra note 39 tbl. 10 (fig-
ures for 1990). 
74. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 69, at 81. 
75. !d. at 82. 
76. See Kane, supra note 72. 
77. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 69. 
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per student and educational performance. 78 However, more recent 
studies prove that certain kinds of expenditure are strongly corre-
lated with achievement, and with subsequent income and wealth. 
Many of the relevant studies on the spending-achievement correla-
tion do not differentiate in how money is spent in school districts, 
and simply look at the levels of overall spending by school districts. 
More precise studies demonstrate that when money is spent on cut-
ting class size and reducing the student-teacher ratio, improving in-
structional materials and improving central office administration, 
student achievement goes up significantly. 79 
The lock-in model of inequality in education provides a pos-
sible explanation for why GP As and LSAT scores continue to 
vary dramatically between whites and certain non-white groups. 
To be sure, LSAT scores are strongly correlated with family as-
sets and neighborhood educational resources. Indeed, it is re-
markable to note that the correlation between family income 
and the SAT scores for college freshman is stronger than the link 
between the test score and college grades. 80 
The lock-in model suggests that these disparities may well 
be locked in permanently, or at least for the long-term future. 
Without significant intervention to dismantle the institutional 
feedback loops between income, neighborhood, school resources 
and conventional measures of merit, institutions of higher learn-
ing will continue to need some race-conscious form of affirma-
tive action to create diverse student populations. 
III. GRUTTER FROM THE LEFT 
What are the implications of this lock-in model for the 
Court's decision in Grutter? This section draws on the foregoing 
description of the lock-in model to develop three critiques of 
78. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, (U.S. 
Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare,1966). 
79. Harold H. Weglinsky, How Money Matters: Models of the Effect of School District 
Spending on Academic Achievement, 70 J. Eouc. Soc. 3 (1997). See also Linda Darling-
Hammond, Teacher Policy and Student Achievement: A Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 
Eouc. PoL'Y A:>~ALYSIS ARCHIVES (Jan. 1, 2(XX)), at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaalv8n1/ (recent 
research demonstrates that school size, class size, curriculum and teacher qualifications make a 
significant difference to performance). 
80. See Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, The Fwure of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming 
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 988 nn.148-52 (citing to statistics showing that 
the correlation between the SAT and income was 0.4 compared to a correlation of be-
tween 0.29 and 0.37 for SAT scores and freshman grades). Likely the correlation with 
accumulated wealth and standardized test scores is significantly higher. See OLIVER & 
SHAPIRO, supra note 69. 
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Grutter. First, Justice O'Connor's aspirational time frame of 
twenty-five years is unrealistic. To the extent that racial disparities 
are locked-in, these disparities are unlikely to disappear by the 
year 2028. Second, Grutter produces no real material gains for 
communities of color. Small-scale diversity-based programs admit 
few students, and the Court's opinion further forecloses the kind 
of large-scale affirmative action necessary to dismantle lock-in. 
Finally, the decision in Grutter appears to serve white inter-
ests more than it does the interests of communities of color. The 
diversity rationale itself symbolically reproduces racial inequality 
by prioritizing white interests. In addition, the Court's opinion 
endorses meritocracy as a compelling government interest, not-
withstanding the fact that conventional meritocratic standards 
privilege white applicants and exclude people of color. Diversity-
oriented affirmative action also conceals the racially disparate 
impact of conventional admissions standards, and permits insti-
tutions to represent such a process as neutral and fair. 
A. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AND COUNTING: 
THE ARTIFICIAL SUNSET CLAUSE 
Given the locked-in nature of inequality, Justice O'Connor's 
twenty-five year aspirational pronouncement in Gruffer seems at 
best naively optimistic and at worst dangerously indifferent to the 
self-reinforcing dynamics of racial inequality (even if it is dicta). No 
evidence exists to support O'Connor's expectation that the wide ra-
cial gaps in LSA T scores or G PAs will disappear before the year 
2025. Indeed, most available evidence points to the contrary.81 
One wonders why Justice O'Connor chose to set a twenty-
five year deadline in Grutter. Justice O'Connor may merely have 
been offering a concession to her more conservative colleagues, 
proposing a time limit in order to make upholding affirmative 
action programs more palatable. The duration of programs is a 
factor the Court must consider in assessing whether an affirma-
tive action program is sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass con-
stitutional muster. 82 From the context of her pronouncement, 
one might guess that O'Connor was setting an artificial deadline 
in order to render such programs constitutional.83 (Or perhaps 
81. See Trial Transcript, T ~stimony of David Whit~. Director of Public Testing, 
Grul!cr v. Bollinger, Civ. Action No. 97-75'!28 (E.D. Mich.) 137 (testifying the racial gap 
in LSAT scores has p~rsist~d for the past twenty-five years). See also WIGHTMA~. supra 
note 6, at 8-14; THE BLACK WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 6. 
82. See Grul!cr v. Bollinger. 53lJ U.S. 306,341-42 (2003). 
83. See Amar & Caminkcr. mpra note 2, at 542 (suggesting that O'Connor included 
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her pronouncement was meant simply to compel policymakers 
to put far more energy into reducing test score and GPA gaps.)84 
The lock-in model suggests that, until policymakers address 
the more general problem of lock-in, the test score and educa-
tional achievement gap may persist or even widen. As a result, 
setting a twenty-five year deadline for diversity-oriented affirma-
tive action might well put communities of color in a no-win posi-
tion. On the one hand, Justice O'Connor's opinion announces an 
artificially limited sunset clause for diversity-oriented affirmative 
action programs. On the other, anti-discrimination law requires 
that affirmative action be limited in scope. As the next section 
will discuss, these small-scale, limited programs can do nothing 
to eliminate locked-in racial disparities in meritocratic measures 
of admission. 
B. "NO PAIN, NO GAIN:" THE NEED FOR LARGE-SCALE 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION 
The lock-in model also suggests that, although the Court's 
decision in Grutter is important for symbolic reasons, small scale 
affirmative action will produce very little material gain for most 
people of color. To be sure, affirmative action in higher educa-
tion provides great benefits for the limited number of students 
who gain admission under such programs. The Grutter decision 
is also symbolically very important, because the Court's holding 
for the moment stems the neo-conservative effort to completely 
eliminate race-conscious preferences. 
At the same time, at a material level, small-scale affirmative 
action does little for communities of color.85 The number of stu-
dents admitted through such programs is small, relative to the 
number of minority students enrolled in four-year colleges and 
universities.86 Only 20-30% of the institutions of higher learning 
the ~xpectation to render affirmative action necessarily limited in duration). 
84. See id. (suggesting that O'Connor may have been signaling to policymakers to 
prioritize the issue of disparities). 
85. Small scale affirmative action programs might have constituted an opportunity 
for law schools ami undergraduate institutions to experiment with alternative conceptu-
alizations of merit and revisions to the law school curriculum, if not its mission. I have 
argued elsewhere that affirmative action programs might also be valuable to the extent 
that they put into place leaders of tomorrow who will re-evaluate the concept of ment 
and the racialized nature of that concept. See Roithmayr, supra note 57. 
86. For example, in the fall of 2000, about a million African-American and "His-
panic" students enrolled in public four year institutions. See AMERICAt' ASSOCIATIOS 
OF STATE COLLEGES ASD Ut-:IYERSITIES, FALL 1990- FALL 2000 ENROL~ENT REPORT6 
(20tXl). 
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are sufficiently selective that they use race to admit applicants.87 
And in those institutions, affirmative action is responsible for a 
relatively small (albeit symbolically very important) number of 
applicants of color. For example, in 1989, affirmative action fa-
cilitated the admission of black applicants to at most an addi-
tional 5-6% of an entering class for most selective institutions.88 
Moreover, for the majority in communities of color who will not 
apply to college or professional school, affirmative action in elite 
law schools does little to improve their relative material position. 
In addition, the lock-in model of inequality suggests that 
small-scale programs of the sort endorsed in Grutter can do very 
little to reduce disparities. Instead, the model suggests that large-
scale affirmative action and redistribution of wealth (perhaps via 
reparations) is necessary to reduce racial differences in GPAs 
and standardized test scores. First, the lock-in model suggests 
that affirmative action needs to be quite massive in magnitude to 
overcome the self-reinforcing effects of earlier monopoly con-
duct. For example, Shelly Lundberg and Richard Startz point 
out that, under a lock-in model of persistent inequality, the self-
reinforcing nature of early advantage may require a large tem-
porary intervention -large enough to jump start a reversal of 
self-reinforcing advantage. 89 
Second, the lock-in model suggests that massive affirmative 
action is needed on multiple fronts, in order to dismantle the in-
stitutional web of structures that reproduces disparity. If educa-
tional inequality is irrevocably linked to housing and employ-
ment, then policymakers cannot address educational disparity 
without also simultaneous!~ addressing housing, employment, 
public services and finance. ° Finally, the lock-in model empha-
sizes the need for wealth redistribution and reparations, to com-
87. See Gary Orficld, CampllS Resegregation and Its Alternatives, in CHILLING 
ADMISSIO~S 7 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1998). See also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & 
DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF TilE RIVER: LOJ>G-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CO!'SIDERING 
RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS xx.xviii (1998) (300 institutions). 
88. See id. at 41 fig. 2.11 (showing actual and hypothetical black matriculants as a 
percentage of all College and Beyond matriculants, demonstrating the difference be-
t ween race-conscious and race-neutral admissions policies, for the year 1989). 
89. According to Lundberg and Startz, in the area of residential segregation, the 
self-reinforcing nature of neighborhood capital on segregation means that even small 
differences will still induce wealthier whites to move out of the neighborhoods. To re-
verse outmigration, neighborhood subsidies would need to be sufficiently large to over-
come the self-reinforcing differences between white and non-white neighborhood capital. 
See Lundberg & Startz, supra note 58. 
90. See id. 
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pensate for the cumulative effects of self-reinforcing advantage 
in terms of assets.91 
Unfortunately, Grutter and a long line of previous cases ef-
fectively foreclose the sort of large-scale affirmative action nec-
essary to dismantle lock-in. Affirmative action programs are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling government interest.92 Neither automatic point 
awards nor ~uotas based on race are permitted, even on a tem-
porary basis. 3 Affirmative action to remedy past discrimination 
is too narrowly circumscribed in employment and education to 
serve as the foundation for large-scale policy interventions.94 
Perhaps most importantly, affirmative action pro,f}rams can-
not be used to remedy "societal discrimination." Because 
locked-in discrimination cannot be traced to a contemporary in-
dividual who intentionally discriminates, locked-in disparities 
are likely to be classified as "societal discrimination. "96 But in 
the Court's view, permitting affirmative action programs to rem-
edy societal discrimination would justify too much in the way of 
government intervention.97 
Under Grutter, diversity programs are likewise just as cir-
cumscribed. Diversity programs must be narrowl.fs tailored to 
achieve the purpose of diversifying the institution. 8 Institutions 
cannot use quotas, and can only use race as one of several "plus" 
factors accorded to applicants who demonstrate the potential to 
contribute a diverse perspective.99 Although institutions can ad-
mit a "critical mass" of applicants via a diversity program, they 
can do so only to the extent that there is a relationship between 
the numbers admitted and the educational diversity benefits to 
the institution. 100 The lock-in model suggests that these nar-
91. See id. at 318-20 (reparations or additional subsidies need to remedy disparities 
in accumulated wealth). See also Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11, at 54. 
92. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
93. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
94. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200 (suggesting that the Court would be unlikely to 
accept affirmative action to remedy past discrimination where there is no proof that the 
entity adopting the program has discriminated nor proof that the individuals who arc 
benefitting from the program were the victims of past discrimination). 
95. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986). 
96. See Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11. 
97. See id. 
98. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,334 (2003). 
99. See id. 
I 00. Cruller. 539 U.S at 336. 
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rowly-tailored, limited programs will make no dent in reducing 
racial disparities in admissions. 
C. THE REPRODUCfiON OF WHITE ADVANTAGE 
This section argues that the Court's opinion in Grutter af-
firmatively privileges white interests, for three reasons. First, the 
diversity rationale itself tends to prioritize white interests, be-
cause the rationale focuses on the value that students of color 
add to the existing merit-admitted (and predominantly white) 
classroom. Second, the Grutter opinion endorses the kind of 
"meritocratic" decisionmaking that privileges the admission of 
white applicants and excludes people of color. Finally, as is made 
clear by the Court's legitimacy rationale, diversity-oriented pro-
grams make it easier for institutions to conceal the discrimina-
tory impact of conventional admissions standards, to the benefit 
of white students. 
1. Undue Burdens, Undue Benefits 
As articulated in Grutter, the diversity rationale appears to 
prioritize white interests, even as the rationale purports to in-
clude the interests of communities of color. In a line of cases ex-
tending back as far as Bakke, the modern Court has discussed 
the need to make sure that affirmative action does not unduly 
burden the interest of whites. 101 In Grutter, however, parts of the 
Court's opinion appear to go beyond limiting undue burdens for 
whites, to affirmatively privileging white interests. 102 
For example, the Court's discussion about the importance 
of a diverse student body suggests that diversity focuses on bene-
fits to white students. In the Court's view, when students of a 
101. In the Court's opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell focused on the burden of af· 
firmativc action to "innocent whites" and their subsequent resentment. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
at 295 (1978). In Richmond v. Croson the Court rejected an affirmative action program 
in large part because of its impact on whites. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 
(1989). Justice Scalia's concurrence warned that treating whites "unfairly" could lead to 
racial hostility. "((E]ven benign racial quotas have victims, whose very real injustice we 
ignore whenever we deny them enforcement of their right not to be disadvantaged on the 
basis of race .... When we depart from this American principle we play with fire, and 
much more than an occasional DeFunis, Johnson or Croson burns." Croson, 488 U.S. at 
527. See also id. at 494 (majority opinion mentions possible racial hostility deriving from 
stigma). 
102. The Court's opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger rejected the undergraduate points-
based program in part because of the Court's concern that the white Italian-American or 
white artist would not be able to gain entry as a diversity candidate. See Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003). 
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wide variety of backgrounds are present, '"classroom discussion 
is livelier, more spirited and simply more enlightening and inter-
esting. "' 103 Likewise, students are "better prepare[ d] for an in-
creasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepare[d] 
... as professionals." 104 
To be sure, the Court suggests generally that all students 
present in the classroom will benefit, including students of color. 
But those students who will be "better" prepared, and for whom 
classroom discussion comparatively is "livelier" and "more in-
teresting" are presumably those white students who have already 
been admitted to elite institutions on the basis of conventional 
admissions standards. 105 Indeed, much of the University of 
Michigan's expert research supported the diversity argument by 
looking to the benefits that white students obtained from cross-
racial interaction. 106 
Likewise, the critical mass concept is one that, paradoxi-
cally, appears to prioritize white interests. In the Court's view, 
admitting a critical mass of students of color is desirable primar-
ily because critical mass breaks down stereotypes for those who 
believe that minorities espouse a monolithic viewpoint. In ap-
proving the law school affirmative action program, the Court 
cites to the University of Michigan's argument that a critical 
mass is essential to diminish the stereotypical "belief that minor-
ity students always (or even consistently) express some charac-
teristic minority viewpoint on any issue."107 
Of course, given the persistence of segregation in employ-
ment, education and housing, minority students are far less likely 
to fall into the trap of believing that minority students express 
some monolithic viewpoint. Indeed, those students are far more 
likely already to have been exposed to a critical mass of people 
of color, with a range of viewpoints, when they come to law 
103. See Gmtter, 539 U.S. at330. 
104. See id. 
105. The Brid for the American Association for Educational Research, to which the 
Court cites, refers primarily to the expert report of Patricia Gurin, which focuses signifi-
cantly on surveys of white students in ascertaining the benefits of cross-racial exposure. 
See Brief for the American Educational Research Association et al, as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003) (02-241). 
\06. See Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, Gratz v. Bollinger (E.D. Mich.) (No. 97-
75321 ); "Empirical Results From the Analysis Conducted for This Litigation: The Effect 
of Structural Diversity on Classroom and Informal Interactional Diversity," Grutter v. 
Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich.) (discussing comparative benefits to white students 
with varying degrees of exposure to students of color). 
107. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. 
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school. In contrast, many whites who attend law school will en-
counter classmates of color for the first time, having also at-
tended segregated public schools and lived in segregated 
neighborhoods. 108 Again, the particular benefit of cross-racial 
understanding and breaking down stereotypes that diversity 
programs provide likely inures primarily to white students. 109 
The Court also finds that diversity in education is compel-
ling because it is good for business. 110 Although benefits to busi-
ness are not exclusively benefits to whites, it is important to note 
the Court's marked shift from a rationale focusing on the bene-
fits to non-whites of eliminating the vestiges of slavery or reme-
dying past discrimination to focusing on benefits to business and 
the military. 111 
It should perhaps come as no surprise that the opinion in 
Grutter focuses on white interests in this way. After all, given the 
Court's restrictive jurisprudence on remedial affirmative action, 
the University of Michigan (perhaps smartly) chose not to push 
any argument that would have focused more directly on benefits 
to communities of color. 112 In addition, the structure of the law-
suit itself contributed to a privileging of white interests- the case 
asked a state institution to justify an affirmative action program 
on the basis of the institution's existing mission. The lock-in 
model suggests that, as institutional structures- for example, the 
institutional mission and objectives-grow up around white ad-
vantage, those practices will serve to reproduce the early advan-
tage that whites acquired by way of monopoly. 
Derrick Bell writes that material gains come to communities 
of color only when those gains serve white interests. 113 Grutter 
demonstrates Bell's point. In Grutter, the compelling govern-
ment interest that the Court uses to justify race-conscious admis-
sions preferences is neither remedying past discrimination nor 
reducing societal discrimination, nor even benefitting the small 
numbers of students who are admitted via diversity programs. 
Rather, the Court finds a compelling interest in diversifying the 
classroom for the benefit of white students. 
I 08. See Expert Report, mpra note 106. 
I 09. Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 328-29. 
110. See id. 
Ill. See David W1lkms, From "Separate Is lnheremly Unequal" 10 "Dtversuy ts Good 
for Busmess: The Rtse of Market-Based Dnermy Argumems and the Fate of 1he Black 
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV L REV 1548 (2004) 
112. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
113. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the /merest Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518,524 (1980). 
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2. Meritocracy vs. Diversity 
The Court's opinion in Grutter favors white interests in a 
second way: by endorsing and protecting elite meritocracy, de-
spite the fact that meritocratic admissions standards dispropor-
tionately exclude applicants of color. To justify this move, the 
Court assumes that racial diversity and academic excellence are 
at odds with one another, and cannot be reconciled except 
through diversity-based affirmative action programs. So, for ex-
ample, the Court declares that a narrowly tailored diversity pro-
gram does not "require a university to choose between maintain-
ing a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to 
provide educational opportunities to members of all racial 
groups." 114 Likewise, the Court assumes that decreasing empha-
sis on GPA and LSAT scores would constitute a dramatic sacri-
fice of "academic quality of all admitted students" and "a vital 
component of [the law school's] educational mission. " 115 
The assumption that academic excellence and diversity are 
at odds with one another is deeply embedded in much of both 
liberal and conservative thinking about affirmative action. Un-
der this view, institutions are structurally pressured to choose be-
tween their commitment to academic excellence (associated with 
success on numerical measures of quality) and the importance of 
admitting applicants of color (whose scores are not as high on 
measures of excellence). In this putative dichotomy, excellence is 
equated with (disproportionately white) success on the LSAT 
and in GPAs; admitting applicants of color is equated with sacri-
fice of standards. Affirmative action then becomes a way to 
avoid the hard choice. 
But the Court ignores several important facts in construct-
ing the parameters of this choice. First, the Court assumes that 
excellence is measured by GPA and LSAT scores, which are 
very heavily weighted in the conventional admissions process. 
Available evidence points to the contrary, however, that LSAT 
scores and GPA constitute very poor predictors of first-year 
grades, let alone of overall excellence. According to the Law 
School Admissions Council, the median predictive power of the 
LSA T for first -year grades is low: the test score explains only 
16% of the variance in first year grades. A combined index ex-
plains only 25% of first-year grades. 116 Beyond first-year per-
114. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
115. See id. at 340. 
116. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATI0:-1 & 
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formance, numerical measures are even less predictive of overall 
academic success, future )ob satisfaction, income, leadership or 
community contribution. 1 7 
Second, the Court assumes that the admission of students of 
color with lower scores entails a sacrifice of excellence. Again, 
available evidence points to precisely the contrary conclusion. 
William Bowen and Derek Bok have extensively documented 
the fact that admitting students of color with lower G PAs and 
scores requires no sacrifice of excellence. 118 Students of color 
with lower numbers who graduate from selective institutions 
earn adequate grades, graduate at similar rates, earn similar in-
comes, achieve advanced degrees and leadership ~ositions at 
even higher rates, and enjoy similar job satisfaction.'' 
Third, the Court assumes that current conceptions of merit 
are race-neutral and not connected to the early white "first-
mover" monopoly advantage that the lock-in model describes. In 
earlier work, I have argued that first-mover monopolist groups 
can use the concept of "standards" to define selection criteria in 
ways that continue to favor themselves. 120 Given that whites mo-
nopolized the legal profession during its Jim Crow days, we 
should not find it surprising that law school admissions standards 
continue to favor white a,Rplicants and disproportionately ex-
clude applicants of color.'-' Moreover, just as educational dis-
parities are locked in, so too are merit standards, owing to the 
self-reinforcing signaling effect of LSA T scores in law school 
INFORMATION BOOK 121 (2002) (""Correlation is stated as a coefficient for which UXJ indi· 
cates an exact correspondence between candidates' test scores and subsequent law school per-
formance .... The closer to 1.00 the correlation cocflicient is, the greater the test's predictive 
validity .... The correlation between LSAT scores and first-year grades varies from one Ia"' 
school to another .... During 2()()(), validity studies were conducted for 183 law schools. Corre-
lations between LSAT scores ranged from 0.13 to 0.62 (median is 0.41 ). Correlations between 
LSAT scores combined with undergraduate grade-point averages and first-year law school 
grades ranged from 0.26 to 0.67 (median is 0.50). ").To be sure, many argue that although the 
LSA Tis a poor predictor, it is the best instrument law schools have. Philip D. Shelton, Admis-
sions Tests: Not Perfect, Just the Best Measures We Have, CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc., July 6, 
2001, at B15. Even so, given the costs in terms of excluding people of color, such low predictive 
value makes continued usc hard to justify. 
117. See Richard 0. Lempert et al., From the Trenches and Towers: Michigan's Mi-
nority Graduate in Practice: The River Runs Through the Law School, 25 L. & Soc. 
INQUIRY 395, 468-69 (20lXJ) (empirical study or Michigan graduates showing that gradu-
ates of color who had been admitted with lower scores and GPAs were as successful as 
white graduates with higher scores). 
118. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 87. 
119. See id. 
120. See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers co Emry, supra note 11. 
121. See id. 
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rankings (and relatedly, employer hiring preferences and alumni 
donations ). 122 
Notwithstanding the disproportionate impact of meri-
tocratic standards, the Court goes out of its way to extend quasi-
constitutional protection of the law school's interest in elite 
standards of excellence. At oral argument, Justice Scalia asked 
Michigan's counsel why the law school did not reduce emphasis 
on the LSAT and GPA, in order to diversify its student body. 123 
Counsel Maureen Mahoney answered that the school should not 
have to choose, and then argued expressly that the state had a 
compelling interest not only in diversity but in elite academic ex-
cellence as well. 124 
In its opinion, the Court accepts the law school's argument 
that elite institutions should not have to choose between excel-
lence and diversity. As Justice Scalia points out, in so doing, the 
Court implicitly finds that the government's interest in elite 
meritocracy is compelling. 125 At the very least, the Court finds 
that the government's interest in elite meritocracy is sufficiently 
compelling that the law school is not required to reduce weight 
on LSAT scores and GPA in order to diversify. 
This ruling is quite troubling, for two reasons. First, the 
Court's implicit holding appears to ignore the discriminatory im-
pact of conventional standards. In any cost-benefit analysis that 
properly considers the interests of communities of color, the dis-
criminatory effect of LSATs and GPAs should outweigh the lim-
ited predictive value of those measures. Second, and relatedly, 
the Court's holding on this issue potentially eviscerates any fu-
ture constitutional challenge to elite standards that dispropor-
tionately or wholly exclude people of color. Indeed, courts could 
potentially rule that a law school's interest in remaining an elite 
institution constitutes a sufficiently compelling interest to justify 
complete exclusion of people of color on the basis of LSA T 
scores.
126 
122. See id. 
123. Transcript, Oral Argument, Gruttcr v. Bollinger, No. 02-241 32 (Aprill, 2003). 
12-+. ··There is a compelling interest in having an institution that is both academically 
~xccllcnt and racially diverse, because our leaders need to be trained in institutions that 
arc excellent, that arc superior academically, but they also need to be trained with expo-
sure to the viewpoints, to the perspectives, to the experiences of individuals from diverse 
backgrounds." See id. at 32-33. 
125. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,353-54 (2003). 
126. As mentioned earlier, non-whites arc far more disproportionately excluded on 
the top end of the standardized test score spectrum. See Lmest News, supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
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In reconciling the so-called tension between meritocracy 
and diversity via affirmative action, elite meritocracy appears to 
take far more than its share. Small-scale diversity-oriented af-
firmative action programs pose no real threat to the interests 
that meritocracy protects (which, one suspects, is precisely what 
makes them acceptable to elite institutions). These limited pro-
grams do not require institutions to systematically eliminate the 
racially disparate impact of conventional standards. Likewise, 
these programs have no effect on the institutionally locked-in 
inequality that perpetuates white monopoly benefits. 
C. DISGUISING RACIAL PRIVILEGE AS RACE-NEUTRAL 
The Court's opinion in Grutter benefits whites in a third ( al-
beit indirect) way. In particular, Grutter approves the kind of 
small-scale diversity-oriented programs that conceal the institu-
tional bias of conventional admissions standards. Because whites 
are disproportionately favored by such standards, disguising such 
racial bias benefits white interests. 
Recent research and experience in several states confirms 
that the small-scale affirmative action conceals the race-specific 
impact of the conventional focus on LSA T and GP A. In both 
Texas and California, where government was prohibited from 
using race in admissions decisions, institutional reliance on con-
ventional admissions standards produced highly segregated law 
school and undergraduate populations. 127 The dramatic resegre-
gation that followed passage of Proposition 209 and the an-
nouncement of the Hopwood decision persuaded Texas and 
California legislatures to adopt the so-called "X percent" plans 
for undergraduate institutions. 128 
Prior to Hopwood and Proposition 209, none of these legis-
latures had taken any sort of action with regard to the racially 
disparate impact of conventional admissions standards. No evi-
dence exists that legislators were even aware of racial disparities 
in LSATs and GPAs. The existence of small-scale affirmative ac-
tion programs had successfully concealed the way in which those 
standards disproportionately excluded applicants of color. 
127. Texas automatically admits the top 10% of each school's graduating class to 
each "general academic teaching institution." TEX. Eouc. CODE ANN. * 51.803 (West 
2001). California admits the top 4% and Florida admits the top 20%. See Jeffrey Selingo, 
What Srates Aren't Saying Abow the 'X-Percem Solwion,' CHR0:-.1. HIGHER Eouc. at 
A31, A32 (2000). 
128. Experts uniformly agree that such plans are race-conscious in nature because 
they rely on the segregated nature of schools in order to produce racial diversity. See id. 
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Likewise, at the national level, small-scale diversity-oriented 
affirmative action conceals nationwide disparities. Research indi-
cates that elite law school populations would quickly resegregate 
on the basis of conventional admissions standards to become al-
most exclusively white. Linda Wightman has documented the 
dramatic impact on students of color that a purel~ "color-blind" 
admissions process would have in legal education.1 9 According to 
her research, such processes would produce dramatic drops in the 
number of students of color at law schools, and not just at the elite 
schools. 130 Similarly, the University of Michigan Law School's ex-
pert, Stephen Raudenbush, testified that, in the absence of any 
race-conscious preference, under-represented minorities would 
constitute only 4% of the law school's entering class, as opposed 
to the actual14.5%.131 
Diversity-based affirmative action serves to hide these facts. 
Diversity programs permit law schools to represent their meri-
tocratic admissions standards as race-neutral, fair and "legiti-
mate," despite the fact that these standards exclude almost all 
applicants of color. The Court's opinion in Grutter is quite open 
about this legitimating function of diversity-based programs. "In 
order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of 
the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly 
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and eth-
nicity."132 Thus, diversity is useful because it helps to convince 
people that meritocracy is fair and legitimate, despite the fact 
that meritocratic standards at the most elite range exclude virtu-
ally all applicants of color. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay offers three central insights from the left in 
evaluating Grutter's small-scale affirmative action program. 
First, if Justice O'Connor truly expects the country to abandon 
race-conscious preferences within the next twenty-five years, 
then government must be allowed to address what the Court has 
termed "societal discrimination." The law must expand the defi-
nition of discrimination to include racial disparities that can be 
129. See Linda Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race As a Factor in Law School Admissions 
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
130. See id. 
131. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320. 
132. See id. at 332. 
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traced to historical anti-competitive exclusion, at the very least. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the U.S. should adopt a definition 
of discrimination that more closely resembles that used in South 
Africa and Canada, a definition that would encompass actions 
that serve to reinforce locked-in discrimination. 133 
Second, and relatedly, the Court should endorse large-scale 
affirmative action, at least as a temporary jumpstart to reversing 
the locked-in effects of a three hundred year monopoly. Indeed, 
in the spirit of antitrust law, institutional structures that perpetu-
ate monopoly ought to be dismantled altogether. For example, 
law schools ought to be required to reduce or eliminate the 
weight of the LSAT and GPA, in law school admissions based 
on their racially disproportionate impact. Just as the Court ap-
proved the dissolution of AT&T and Standard Oil, so too should 
institutions be required to radically restructure in order to dis-
mantle racial monopoly. 134 
Third, all institutions, selective and otherwise, should de-
velop a set of admissions standards that are both "fair and func-
tional. "135 To be fair, admissions standards should not systemati-
cally and disproportionately exclude people of color or the poor 
(or any other discrete and definable group) on the basis of self-
reinforcing advantage that can be traced to historical anti-
competitive conduct. Law schools and other institutions of 
higher learning should commit themselves to developing stan-
dards that promote participation by all segments of society. 
To be functional, admissions criteria should more accurately 
predict a student's ability to benefit from a program of educa-
tion. As it is, conventional merit standards defer far too heavily 
to measures of merit that do not even accurately predict for first-
year performance, let alone overall performance in school or 
success in the profession. Law schools should re-tool their as-
sessments of merit to more closely correspond with those skills 
and abilities that are required for the everyday practice of law, to 
include client listening and interviewing, case management and 
other clinical skills. 
Having sounded the harsh note of critique, it is extremely 
important to re-iterate the importance of diversity-based af-
firmative action to the symbolic commitment to racial empow-
erment. It is important, of course, for those of us on the left to 
133. See Roiihmayr, Locked In Segregation, supra note 11. 
134. See id. 
135. See Guinier & Sturm, supra note 80. 
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remain committed to preserving affirmative action no matter the 
scale, even as conservatives gear up for another round of attacks 
on diversity-based programs. Race-conscious affirmative action 
serves as a symbolic bulwark, a race-conscious counter to the 
meritocratic admissions standards that serve to reproduce racial 
inequality. But those of us on the left should also recognize the 
significant limitations of diversity-based program and the impor-
tance of dismantling locked-in monopoly of resources. It is im-
portant that we not abandon the more expansive view of racial 
justice in the quest to preserve the limited remedy of affirmative 
action. 
Ironically, the issue of diversity-based affirmative action ex-
poses an issue on which scholars on the left and conservatives 
claim to agree: both sides argue that affirmative action does little 
to address the dramatic disparities in access to educational re-
sources. As Kimberle Crenshaw points out, however, conserva-
tives do not appear willing to devote significant resources and 
energy to eliminate racial disparities at the primary and secon-
dary levels. 136 At the same time, radical scholars need to con-
tinue to devote as much energy to that fight as to the fight to 
preserve affirmative action-and now, in the wake of Justice 
O'Connor's twenty-five year sunset clause, perhaps even more 
quickly. 
136. Kimberle Crc:nshaw, Beyond Affirmative Action: The Twenty-Five Year Detente, 
at http.//www.aapf.org/pagcs/dctcnte.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (pointing out that 
no serious steps were taken by proponents of Proposition 209 after the passage ol the 
referendum to secure real educational equality). 
